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Preventing ‘A Virological Hiroshima’:
Cold War Press Coverage of Biological
Weapons Disarmament
Brian Balmer, and Alex Spelling
University College London, UK
Caitríona McLeish
University of Sussex, UK
This article examines representations of biological weapons during a crucial
period in the recent history of this form of warfare. The study draws on a
corpus of newspaper articles from the US New York Times and the UK Times
and Guardian written around the time of the negotiation period of the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention, the international treaty banning this form
of warfare. We argue that a conventional discourse can be found wherein bio-
logical weapons are portrayed as morally offensive, yet highly effective and
militarily attractive. Interwoven with this discourse, however, is a secondary
register which depicts biological weapons as ineffective, unpredictable and
of questionable value for the military. We finish with a somewhat more specu-
lative consideration of the significance of these discourses by asking what
might have been at stake when journalists and other writers deployed such dif-
fering representations of biological warfare.
keywords biological warfare, biological weapons, germ warfare, media,
newspaper, disarmament, Cold War
Cold War politics and Cold War science were no strangers to each other.1 So, when
on 5 April 1971, the New York Times published a letter of complaint to the editor
from Nobel Prize winning professor of genetics, Joshua Lederberg, it was little sur-
prise to find him addressing the politics of biology. Lederberg’s complaint was that
an earlier editorial, ‘Sideshow at Geneva’, had trivialized both the danger of
1Research for this article was supported by Arts and Humanities Research Council (GB); Award Number: AH/K003496/
1; Recipient: Brian Balmer, PhD.
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biological warfare (BW) – the use of disease as a weapon – and the on-going diplo-
matic negotiations in Geneva aimed at an international treaty to outlaw such
weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The editorial had suggested
that these were ‘weapons nobody expects to use anyway’. On the contrary,
argued Lederberg, ‘if the Geneva conference can reach accords that will help
prevent a virological Hiroshima, this would indeed be a substantive and meaningful
accomplishment’. Faced with conveying to his audience a sense of the destructive-
ness of the unfamiliar world of BW, Lederberg anchored his description in the
more familiar world of the first atomic bomb. It is this and other imagery invoked
around BW that preoccupies us in this article.
Significantly, for Lederberg, international diplomacy could not be regarded as her-
metically sealed, and therefore the tone of press coverage mattered. He wrote: ‘The
public perception of the importance of BWmay now have a practical bearing on the
pace of further progress towards firm international agreement’ (NYT 5/4/71: 280).2
Lederberg may have been overstating the power of public opinion, but this should
not detract from the fact that during the negotiations and up until the entry into
force of the BWC (1967–1975), the topic received attention from the news media.
While overshadowed by press coverage of nuclear arms control issues, particularly
the negotiations leading up to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), bio-
logical weapons coverage was not insignificant.3 Moreover, while some coverage
of biological weapons issues was short and prosaic, there were sufficient editorials,
commentaries, feature articles, and other coverage published that contained leng-
thier discussion and description. These richer sources provide the opportunity to
examine how biological weapons were represented in the print media, and this
article aims to undertake such an analysis of broadsheet articles from the USA
(New York Times), and UK (The Guardian and The Times) between 1967 and
1975. The focus is on biological weapons and we do not intend to cover represen-
tation of all types of so-called weapons of mass destruction: atomic, chemical, and
biological.4 We will discuss the reasons behind our choices and other methodologi-
cal issues in due course. Our main argument is that ‘what biological weapons are’ –
their nature, moral status, and capabilities –was portrayed in two distinct ways. The
predominant press discourse represented biological weapons as highly dangerous
and highly effective, therefore in need of banning under international law. Inter-
twined with this discourse of fear and effectiveness, perhaps more surprisingly, we
found a counter-discourse that envisaged an unpredictable, ineffective, or militarily
unattractive weapon, suggesting that any international agreement to ban such a
weapon was merely cosmetic.
2In this article primary sources from theNew York Times are abbreviated (NYT) and dates for primary sources are DD/
MM/YY.
3As a rough indicator, we searched the Proquest newspaper database for mentions of ‘biological weapons’ and ‘strategic
arms limitation’ in theNew York Times (USA) andGuardian (UK) between 1967 and 1975. 307 articles mentioned ‘bio-
logical weapons’; 987 articles mentioned ‘strategic arms limitation’.
4Biological or bacteriological weapons refer to the use of living organisms (disease), whereas chemical weapons are inert
toxic materials (for example, chlorine and mustard gas used in the First World War).
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There exists a small, but rich, historiography of twentieth-century BW pro-
grammes.5 The literature on the UK traces biological weapons research and policy
from inter-war concerns about spies testing potential BW agents on the London
Underground, through clandestine attempts to produce anti-personnel and
anti-livestock agents in the Second World War, followed by a massive expansion
of effort in the Cold War (Carter, 2000; Balmer, 2001, 2012; Hammond and
Carter, 2001; Schmidt, 2015). At this time, the Chiefs of Staff prioritized biological
weapons research on a par with atomic research (Balmer, 2001: 62), but this priority
was short-lived. Defence cuts in the wake of the Korean War and the rise of Britain’s
independent nuclear deterrent meant that by the late 1950s Britain had abandoned
its offensive programme, although research continued on ways of defending the UK,
which was regarded as a particularly vulnerable – as an island – to a large-scale bio-
logical attack. For the USA, historians have charted the rise of its biological weapons
programme in the Second World War and its varying fortunes ranging from periods
with little support, to periods – such as during the Korean War – where the pro-
gramme was taken more seriously (Moon, 1999, 2006, forthcoming; Guillemin,
2005). In 1956, US policy was secretly revised from one of retaliation in kind to
use at the discretion of the President. Then, in 1969, President Nixon unilaterally
renounced offensive biological weapons (Tucker and Mahan, 2009), by which
time the US military had – again in secret – created a stockpile of lethal and incapa-
citating agents and weapons and, during the early 1960s, carried out Project 112, a
massive series of tests in the Pacific to disperse agents over large areas.
It is not the intention of this article to re-tell this detailed history through press
sources. Much of this literature focuses on charting the development of research
and policy, and where press sources are used they generally are used to supplement
archival sources in telling this historical narrative.6 Instead, we have a narrower
focus on how biological weapons were represented in the press. Put another way,
what would someone reading newspapers in the late 1960s and early 1970s have
been told about what a biological weapon can do? As such, this article is a prelimi-
nary attempt to understand the cultural history of disease as a weapon. Within the
history of science there exist cultural histories of nuclear weapons, and the notion
that we can understand ColdWar paranoia and fear through the lens of ‘nuclear cul-
tures’ has gained some traction (e.g. Weart, 1989; Boyer, 1994; Hogg and Laucht,
2012). By stark contrast other unconventional weapons, including biological
weapons, have received scant historical attention as cultural artefacts, or more
specifically as sources or mediators of Cold War anxieties. Corcos (2003) provides
a short discussion of science fiction and biological weapons in film, noting the
5As well as the UK and USA see Wheelis et al. (2006) for Canada, France, USSR, Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries,
Iraq, South Africa; Avery (2013) for Canada; Gould et al. (2002) on South Africa; Leitenberg and Zilinskas (2012) on
the former Soviet Union.
6Hammond and Carter (2001: 211–35 (chapter 15)) and Balmer (2012: 91–114 (chapter 6)) each have a whole chapter
on press coverage, using it to analyse particular episodes where the Microbiological Research Establishment in the UK
became the focus of media coverage. As such, they concentrate on what was reported rather than, as here, the imagery
used.
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recurrent motif of official failure to respond to attacks. Mayor’s exploration of
chemical and BW in the ancient world does draw attention to the wider cultural sig-
nificance of peculiar fears attached to both disease and poison – for example,
through her discussion of the historical association often made between women
and poison (Mayor, 2003). Within history of medicine, wider attention has been
paid to cultural histories of disease following seminal works on how disease can
be ‘framed’ differently across societies or over time (Rosenberg and Golden,
1992), and on the power of metaphors used to describe disease (Sontag, 1979).
Yet, there has been little connection made to how such approaches can inform
our understanding of the deliberate use of disease as a weapon of war (although
see Cooter, 2003 for a more general discussion of the association between war
and epidemics). More contemporary social studies of science have analysed how
the media have represented such diverse phenomena as ‘mad cow disease’, genes,
and hospital ‘super-bugs’ (Nelkin and Lindee, 2004; Washer, 2006; Washer and
Joffe, 2006). Within this context, our wider aim is to explore how the print media
have constructed multiple and apparently contradictory framings of disease as a
weapon.
Our corpus of newspaper articles was obtained through a search of the Proquest
and Times Online newspaper databases. Searches were made for articles between
1967 and 1975 in the New York Times, The Guardian, and The Times. The three
were picked partly because of their wide readership, and partly on the pragmatic
grounds that they have been digitized. Using the search term ‘biological weapons’
yielded 427 articles, and ‘biological weapons OR biological warfare’ yielded 851
articles. Many mentions were peripheral or, when directly on topic, were in short,
information-provision articles. Therefore, we manually sifted our corpus down to
168 articles of direct relevance to the BWC, with the majority of coverage
between 1968 and 1971.7 Historians have developed a variety of approaches to
understanding the relationship between war and media (e.g. Connelly and Welch,
2004). And, as Bingham notes, newspaper databases yield searches that can be
more rigorous and sensitive than conventional searching (Bingham, 2010).
Bingham also points out that, although the increasing number of digitized archives
offers a rich source for historians, there are several methodological caveats that
limit, though do not eliminate, their usefulness. In particular, we need to be aware
of a bias towards digitizing broadsheet reporting, which is not necessarily represen-
tative of all press opinion. Search results also remove immediate context (e.g. what
else was on the page, whether the article was front page or buried in the newspaper);
they also ignore the contexts of production and reception by readers. Readers should
be sensitive to all of these problems as they read this article. That said, we would add
a number of points. First, our discussion is confined to three widely-read broadsheet
newspapers, but also deliberately confined to the language used to portray what
constitutes a biological weapon. Had we been trying to make systematic
7The breakdown was New York Times (65), The Guardian (55), and The Times (48).
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comparisons (e.g. UK vs. USA) or generalize about areas where one would expect
obvious differences across newspapers (e.g. political opinion, commentary on
specific events such as protests) then we would have less confidence that our
choice of newspapers could yield useful information. Moreover, even had we aban-
doned databases to include a greater selection of newspapers, the question would
remain of just how many and whether or not other media sources (radio and televi-
sion) were needed. As such we remain confident that, within the constraints outlined
here, we provide a credible account of the depiction of biological weapons in the
press.
Disarmament and the BWC
The idea that international treaties and law should codify the ancient custom, that
weapons employing poison of either chemical or biological origins are not permiss-
ible as weapons of war, dates to the mid-1800s. The phrasing of codification efforts
was shaped by external factors, such as events prompting the initiation of nego-
tiations, but also reflected contemporary technical-scientific understanding. Conse-
quently, early codification efforts focused on forestalling the military development of
chemical weapons or, after the experience of gas warfare in the First World War,
ensuring that never again could gas be used on a battlefield, and such efforts used
terms such as ‘poison’ or ‘poisoned weapons’ and in the 1925 Geneva Protocol ‘bac-
teriological methods of warfare’.8 The 1925 Geneva Protocol was adopted by
several nations as essentially a ‘no first use’ agreement with respect to chemical
and biological weapons (CBW) (signatories could still make preparations for their
use).
The experiences of the First World War also gave impetus to the idea of the need
for an international convention to achieve universal reduction and limitation of
armaments.9 In the end, geopolitics scuppered the potential of this draft convention
and the withdrawal of Germany, and German rearmament, brought about the
breakdown of the Disarmament Conference. By the time international diplomatic
attention returned to the idea of extending the ‘no first use’ prohibition on CBW
contained within the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Cold War had started. During
this period efforts to ban CBW were overshadowed by the pursuit of nuclear
weapons disarmament.
Discussions about CBW would momentarily become animated in response to
external events, such as in the 1950s when the USA was alleged to have used
8See, for example, Article 70 of the 1863 Lieber Code; Article 13(a) of the 1874 Brussels Convention on the Law and
Customs of War; Article 23(a) of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations
9A UK draft convention was submitted in 1933 and proposed extending the already agreed upon no first use prohibition
with an absolute prohibition of the use of biological weapons even for retaliation; a ban on preparations for both chemi-
cal and biological weapons in time of peace as well as in time of war; and a complaints procedure for investigation
breaches of the prohibition. UK (1933) ‘Draft Convention Submitted By The United Kingdom Delegation’,
Conf. D. 157. Geneva, 16th March 1933. http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000050.pdf. For a review of
the potential of this Draft Convention see Goldblatt (1971).
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bacteriological and chemical weapons in Korea and China, or the allegation that
Egypt used chemical weapons in Yemen in 1967. During these moments, just as in
the pre-cold war days, the two categories of weaponry were taken together as one
issue to be resolved using the same approach. This situation changed in the late
1960s (Wright, 2002; Chevrier, 2006; Spelling et al., 2015). Discussions by the
UN-sponsored Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee began to consider two
options. First, whether there was a need to revise the Geneva Protocol or, second,
to negotiate some additional instrument to clarify and strengthen its provisions
while keeping the Protocol itself intact. Distinguishing between, on the one hand,
chemical weapons that ‘have been used on a large scale in war in the past and…
regarded by some states as a weapons they must be prepared to use if necessary in
any future war’ and, on the other hand, the now termed ‘microbiological methods
of warfare’, the use of which ‘has never been established [but] generally regarded
with even greater abhorrence than chemical methods’, the UK submitted a
working paper on 6 August 1968. This noted ‘the choice lies between going
ahead with the formulation of new obligations or doing nothing at all’.10 The
UK’s suggestion, disliked by the Socialist, non-aligned countries, and the USA,
was to deal first with the relatively easy issue of biological weapons before tackling
the more complicated issue of chemical weapons.
External pressures undoubtedly shaped the level of international political atten-
tion given to CBW during 1968–1970. Such pressures included public opinion
regarding the nature and dangers of CBW; accidents involving chemical weapons;
the continued use of herbicides and tear gas in military operations in Vietnam; pro-
tests by scientists against the military use of their work; and appeals to renounce the
use of and abolish CBW made by the United Nations and international organiz-
ations such as the World Health Organization, and the International Committee
of the Red Cross. However, internal blockages required removal if a biological
weapons-only treaty was to be successfully concluded. Unilateral actions were
crucial in this respect, such as the announcement by US President Nixon on 25
November 1969 that the USA was renouncing its biological weapons capability
and intended to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol.11 Regarding biological
weapons, his statement proclaimed the renunciation of the use of lethal biological
agents and weapons and all other methods of warfare, disposal of existing stocks
of weapons and confinement of biological research to defensive measures only.
What would become the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, also known as the Biological Weapons Convention
10Disarmament Conference Document ENDC/231
11National Security Decision Memorandum 35, Washington, DC, 25 November 1969, in FRUS, document 165, avail-
able at www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e2/83596.htm On the 14th February 1974 a further announcement was made
extending the same provisions to weapons using toxins: Office of the White House Press Secretary (Key Biscayne, FL),
Statement on Toxins, 14 February 1970, in FRUS, document 189, available at www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e2/
83627.htm. See Tucker and Mahan (2009).
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came quickly thereafter. In less than 20 months four draft convention texts were
tabled, beginning on 18 August 1970 with a draft convention, revised from that
which the UK had submitted on 10 July 1969. The text that was eventually
agreed emerged from bilateral Soviet and US talks and was opened for signature
on 10 April 1972, entering into force on 26 March 1975.
Biological Weapons and Popular Culture
In the context of open press coverage, it is an important reminder that although
many states invested in biological weapons research programmes during the Cold
War, all were shrouded in tremendous secrecy (Guillemin, 2005; Wheelis et al.,
2006, chapters 2–9). By the late 1960s, occasional television or press coverage,
and a number of popular science books, had provided some fleeting glimpses
behind the closed doors of the British and US research programmes, but much
remained hidden (Hammond and Carter, 2001; Balmer, 2012, 2015).
Fictional accounts of disease as a weapon of war formed a more accessible source
of imagery and speculation about what constituted biological weapons. To give a
few prominent examples, The Satan Bug thriller (book 1962, film 1965) and the
James Bond spy story On Her Majesty’s Secret Service (book 1963, film 1969)
both involved BW agents. Although not specifically about biological weapons, the
theme of contamination and invasion was developed in the book (1969) and film
(1970) of The Andromeda Strain (1970), with a plot centred on scientists fighting
an alien virus, and in The Omega Man (1971) set in a world surviving the aftermath
of a viral apocalypse. And 3 years later, in The Crazies, an American town becomes a
scene of carnage after an army plane crashes with its viral payload. Science fiction
novels that dealt with biological weapons included Robert C O’Brien’s A Report
From Group 17 (1972), William Haggard’s The Bitter Harvest (1971), and the
Quality of Mercy (1965) by D.G. Compton (dealing with BW used to combat over-
population). At perhaps a more light-hearted level, in 1970 theNew Scientistmaga-
zine launched its ‘Grimbledon Down’ cartoon series, satirizing the secret work of the
UK Microbiological Defence Establishment base at Porton Down, Wiltshire and
where ‘the battle with an ever-inquisitive press, demonstrations, Official Secrets
Act, ‘security regs’, and an ever-threatened visit from the ministry chiefs fromWhite-
hall were regular fare for the weekly strip’ (Tidy, 1994). In short, while glimpses of
actual biological defence research were rare, the topic remained visible in popular
culture.
Beyond the ‘Doomsday Bug’
Much of the press reporting around the BWC negotiations depicted biological
weapons as highly effective and morally repugnant. So, in a lengthy New York
Times feature article entitled ‘Dare We Develop Biological Weapons?’, journalist
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Seymour Hersh, who had also authored the recently published book Chemical and
Biological Warfare: America’s Hidden Arsenal, noted that with current military
research on BW: ‘man’s ingenuity could develop what in effect would be a ‘dooms-
day bug’, a disease so uncontrollable it would trigger a pandemic across the world’
(NYT 28/9/69: 28). The article was illustrated with a picture of the outline of a bomb
made from a photograph of bacteria under a microscope. The caption warned
Doomsday Bugs: This bomb cut-out was made from a photograph of plague
germs (Pasturella pestis) taken from an infected mouse spleen. The US Army
is cultivating such highly infectious organisms – and developing weapons
which could deliver them on targets – as a deterrent. One question: Would a
plague once loosed become a plague on all our houses? (NYT 28/9/69: 28)
Although Hersh noted the extreme secrecy surrounding research into these
weapons, he provided some details of work in the US programme, and was in no
doubt that the USA ‘was fully capable of mounting an effective biological attack’.
The feature also discussed disarmament, arguing that an international agreement
was long overdue.
Despite painting this picture of an effective and militarily attractive weapon,
Hersh’s feature article also sowed its own seeds of doubt. By describing laboratory
accidents, by quoting an un-named Government official saying ‘we’ve been asking
the Army for years to find the Russian biological test facility… and it can’t’, and
by quoting US Defense Secretary Melvin Laird pronouncing that ‘the deterrent
aspects of biological agents are not as sharply defined [as chemical weapons]’,
Hersh created a different picture, within the same article, of a less sure weapon
with the potential to backfire, whose interest to the Soviets might be exaggerated,
and where uncertainties abounded. Indeed, Hersh finished his article with the ques-
tion: ‘Does the United States really need to invest funds in a weapons system that
may not work and will not deter?’
Hersh’s doubts notwithstanding, the effectiveness of BW is highlighted in many
articles that covered the BWC negotiations, often stressing their unique or distinctive
features. They could ‘kill whole cities’ (NYT 26/11/69), they are ‘biological fire…
the most powerful knowledge conceivable’ (NYT 8/12/69). At the height of the
BWC negotiating process, The Times’ Geneva correspondent summarized Lord
Chalfont, the British Minister for Disarmament, warning that an attack of
anthrax spores would cause ‘millions of men, women and children to die an agonis-
ing and revolting death’ and then quoted him directly as stressing the unique nature
of BW: ‘surely no-one can seriously suggest this is not a weapon of an appallingly
different kind from any that man has yet imagined for his own destruction’
(Times 8/4/70).
Beyond this general impression of effectiveness and uniqueness of biological
weapons that was conveyed in the press reporting, journalists, and other commen-
tators often cited specific reasons for their effectiveness. These reasons included the
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pace with which they were being developed; their scope; the ease of production;
the difficulty of defending against them; their ‘bio’ nature (i.e. that they could
disrupt the natural balance of ecosystems, could breed in the body and spread,
and similar appeals to their living nature); and the ease with which other nations
could acquire them. We will discuss these features in turn, but our main point is
that they moved beyond a rather inchoate, albeit palpable, description that rep-
resented biological weapons as effective and provided readers with an array of
more precise features that marked the weapons out as candidates for international
disarmament.
One of the key features ascribed to biological weapons was their pace of develop-
ment. Indeed, temporality is a recurrent motif in the press coverage: biological
weapons are effective now or, alternatively, the threat is on the time-horizon and
approaching rapidly. For example, The Times reported in November 1970 that
the Disarmament Conference in Geneva had been warned by scientist Joshua Leder-
berg of ‘possibly sinister scientific advances’ and that it was already possible to
‘invent new diseases’. An editorial in the same newspaper, published the following
March and commenting on how the Russian Draft Treaty had opened up a realistic
chance of negotiating the convention, noted that although germ weapons were cur-
rently deemed ineffective, ‘yet another decade of intensive development could make
them dangerous and effective’ (Times 31/3/71). Lena Jenger, a Labour Member of
Parliament, wrote for the Guardian on the success of the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty that we should not overlook that ‘our hands are busy preparing
cheaper killers’ than atomic weapons. Citing an American Association of Scientific
Workers report from 1947 and its warning about biological weapons, Jenger contin-
ued: ‘but after 20 years of rapid development in the biological sciences, we can all,
no doubt do much better than this.’ (Guardian 12/6/68). So, whether their reality
was immediate or deferred, all of these reports evoke a sense of imminence and
urgency around the problem of biological weapons.
Various articles made reference to the ease with which biological weapons could
be produced or used. Laurence Marks writing in the Observer, for example, noted
that all that the perpetrators would need was a building the size of a lock-up
garage (Observer 27/7/69).12 Nigel Calder, writing about his edited book of pre-
dictions about future war, Unless Peace Comes, depicted biological weapons as
‘much easier for any nation to develop than are H-bombs’, and echoing the tem-
porality theme just discussed, cautioned that they were ‘already reaching the point
where they become not only an alarming prospect but a practical threat’ (Guar-
dian 31/3/68). While also easy to disseminate, Calder added that ‘defence against
such biological attacks will be correspondingly difficult’. This feature of BW is
repeated in several articles. Claims such as ‘a principal factor in US reluctance
to renounce germ warfare is that there is practically no defence’ (Guardian 29/
9/1969), ‘the frightening thing about germ warfare is that the poorest of
12The Observer is the Sunday edition of The Guardian.
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nations can indulge in it and there is no comprehensive form of defence’ (Guar-
dian 27/11/69), and ‘no certain defence against them can be planned’ (Times 3/7/
69) are dotted throughout the coverage. News coverage and commentary also
pointed to the ability of the weapons to affect huge areas. For example:
‘100,000 square kilometres, whereas nuclear weapons would be expected to
affect only 300 square kilometres’ (Guardian 10/7/69). In the same edition of
the paper, a detailed article with the title ‘Why Germ War Must Be Banned’ by
Hella Pick considered that certain agents were ‘potentially unconfined in their
effects both in time and space’ (Guardian 10/7/69).
Pick’s article also pointed to the source of the weapons’ uniqueness residing in
their biology. As such, it was the living nature of the biological weapon that elevated
it to a category of weapon that required banning. Writers conveyed this significant
‘aliveness’ in two senses in their reporting, the first emphasizing the ecological and
second the physiological effects of biological weapons. Pick’s article illustrated the
first sense when she pointed out that, as living components of ecosystems, these
weapons might ‘have irreversible effects on the balance of nature’. Whereas the
second sense emerged in articles such as the Times article cited earlier in this
section, where Chalfont is reported to have said that ‘one significant difference
between biological weapons and chemical and nuclear ones was that the germs
used in the human body could breed in the body’ (Times 7/4/70).
Although some press reporting simply left readers to infer that an effective
weapon was also a militarily useful weapon, other reporting provided more direct
indications of a link. It is worth considering here that the one does not necessarily
follow from the other – a crossbow, for example, is effective but not of great use
in modern warfare, especially when compared with other available equipment.
Reporters and commentators drew the link between effectiveness and utility
through frequent reference to the doctrine of retaliation in kind: the opportunity
to retaliate against biological weapons with biological weapons. The term had cul-
tural resonance. Although the Cuban missile crisis had shifted policy from massive
retaliation to a more flexible response, retaliation in kind with nuclear weapons
remained a central tenet of US defence policy at this time. The ‘in kind’ nature of
the retaliation in turn suggests that military or political leaders might be prompted
to find a use for BW. Although implied rather than stated, the abnormality of cir-
cumstances that would drive a nation to use these weapons resonates with the
abnormality of the weapons themselves. After all, retaliation does not necessarily
have to amount to retaliation in kind. In a similar vein, a New York Times discus-
sion of what followed from Nixon’s 1969 unilateral renunciation of biological
weapons pointed out that the President had given up the ‘remote possibility’ of
using these weapons. Again, this implied that, while certainly not a weapon of
first choice, they still possessed some military value. A number of articles indirectly
suggested that biological weapons had military value by reference to their role in
military planning. For instance, ‘the Russians had always believed that a war in
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Europe would involve the use of nuclear weapons and chemical and biological
weapons as well, Mr Healey, Secretary for Defence, said yesterday’ (Guardian 26/
7/68); ‘The Russians make no secret of their assumption, in public at least, that…
these unconventional forms of warfare would be used in any future large-scale con-
flict in Europe’ (Guardian 6/8/69).
A variation on this theme of utility was that although these weapons were of no
use for ‘advanced’ countries, they might prove attractive to other nations. So,Guar-
dian coverage of a UN experts’ report on biological and chemical weapons quoted
from the report: ‘any developing country could in fact acquire a limited capability of
this kind of warfare’ (Guardian 10/7/69). The Times coverage of the same report
likewise drew attention to the point that ‘particular danger derives from the fact
that any country could develop or acquire a capability in this type of warfare’
(Times 3/7/69).
‘Primitive Hatred and Fear’: Moral Judgement and the Media
Interwoven with this print media portrayal of disease as an effective weapon, and the
reasons why that weapon was particularly deserving of censure, writers frequently
pronounced moral judgement on BW.13 This was sometimes simply expressed as a
general, ineffable sense of revulsion and horror. Terms such as ‘horror’, ‘appalling’,
‘against human instinct’, ‘abhorrence’ were all used to refer to BW. To give specific
instances, reporting on the early British government initiative to raise the issue of
chemical and biological disarmament in Geneva, The Guardian noted ‘widely
held moral revulsion against these weapons’ (Guardian 18/7/68). And the Times edi-
torial ‘Realism Replaces Propaganda’ stated bluntly that ‘they arouse primitive
hatred and fear in all mankind’ (Times 31/3/71). Covering the Nixon decision to
renounce biological weapons, correspondent Richard Lyons wrote that the ban
would ‘bar American use of an array of killers whose very names stir thoughts of
a chamber of horrors’ (NYT 26/11/69). Shortly after the first signatures were put
to the BWC, Alun Chalfont, writing mainly about attempts to move chemical disar-
mament forward in the wake of the treaty, claimed that ‘even those who regard war
as a legitimate instrument of national policy have a natural revulsion against certain
categories of weapon – usually, and understandably, the weapons of indiscriminate
slaughter’ (Guardian 26/4/72). Throughout the press reporting, terms such as
‘natural’ and ‘primitive’ served to lift condemnation beyond the ‘merely’ legal or
conventional and ground it in a visceral and universally shared moral sense.
Other references to the taboo surrounding BW provided readers with more than
this general sense of revulsion. The unique nature of these biological weapons, as
discussed in the previous section, was sometimes linked to their moral opprobrium.
The implication of stressing uniqueness was that there existed an index of horror,
with BW in a category of its own apart from other means of killing. Besides
13For philosophical discussion of the ethics of biological warfare see Haldane (1987).
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uniqueness, writers in a few articles provided another reason behind the taboo: that
BW turned healing upside down. For instance, the New York Times reporting on a
debate about whether toxins – inert poisons derived from living organisms – counted
as biological weapons pointed out that
The real root of the opposition to the employment of toxins is the horror of
using human disease as a weapon. We live in a world where, fortunately,
healing the sick is regarded as one of the noblest callings. To turn the knowledge
thus gained inside out for military ends is, to many, abhorrent. (NYT 4/1/70)
There was also the occasional suggestion that the moral problem resided in the
links between academic science and the military. One example is in an article with
the headline ‘Porton work is troubling scientists’ that made the front page of The
Times, about a series of 21 letters sent to the UK Prime Minister, Harold Wilson,
asking for work on chemical and biological defence at the military research estab-
lishment at Porton Down in Wiltshire to be made public (Times 27/6/68).14 Just a
few days before, and raising similar concerns, the Guardian covered a ‘stormy’
meeting of the American Society of Microbiology which had just dissolved its advi-
sory committee to the US Army.15 Making the announcement, Professor Salvador
Luria from MIT had ‘indicated that a sense of moral responsibility lay behind the
decision. The implication was that the society… was ethically opposed to a connec-
tion with the US Army’s biological warfare centre’ (Guardian 25/6/68). Less directly,
in a report on a 1969 meeting about CBWorganized by the Women’s International
Peace Movement, the Times science correspondent Pearce Wright quoted one del-
egate, Professor O. V. Baroyan from the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences,
saying ‘I speak for many scientists when I say I do not want to work for the devil,
I want to work for mankind’ (Times 24/7/69).
There was also a suggestion that biological weapons broke the laws of war. The
editorial in The Times marking the signing of the BWC noted that ‘Germ warfare
has always held a particularly sinister connotation, conjuring repugnant images
and transgressing every rule in the curious code of conduct which governs strife’
(Times 10/4/72).
A Second Discourse about Effectiveness: ‘Questionable Value’
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that a fairly cohesive representation of
the effectiveness and capabilities of biological weapons was portrayed in the print
media during the BWC negotiation period. However, although this dominant rep-
resentation of a horrendous, powerful, dangerous, and useful weapon ran through-
out the press coverage, it is not the only portrayal of BW in the newspapers. A
14Porton’s negative image at this time is discussed by Balmer (2012: 91–114 (chapter 6) and 2015), and Hammond and
Carter (2001: 211–35 (chapter 15)).
15Avery (2013: 119–46 (chapter 4)) discusses deep-seated divisions within the Society on this matter.
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second register of discourse painted biological weapons as ineffective and of no par-
ticular military value. At times this depiction was used to bolster the case for the
abolition of biological weapons – an ‘after all, who needs them’ line of attack. In
other writing, commentators used this register to express scepticism about the
BWC or the negotiating process.
Before discussing the characteristics of this more sceptical portrayal of biological
weapons, it is worth pointing out that many doubts expressed in the press were less
with the idea of biological disarmament per se, and instead focused more on the
pragmatic aspects of the diplomatic process. So, for example, the separation of
chemical from biological disarmament, reassurances that stockpiles would be
destroyed, that signatories would commit to later chemical disarmament, and
whether or not to repeat the Geneva Protocol’s ban on use in the BWC became
topics for news articles. Arguably, it was easier to make a news story about some
hiccup or other in the negotiating process and to express doubt about whether the
treaty could ever be successfully negotiated than to report that negotiations were
running smoothly.
We have already encountered the sceptical narrative in the dismissive editorial
that prompted Lederberg’s letter, and that opened the discussion in this article. It
also surfaced in our earlier discussion of Seymour Hersh’s feature article, ‘Dare
We Develop Biological Weapons?’ (NYT 28/9/69). As mentioned, although
Hersh’s article drew heavily on the notion of biological weapons as effective,
towards the later sections Hersh also posited that these were untried, untested
weapons that could be unpredictable in both use and during the research process.
It is this uncertain picture of biological weapons that Hersh invoked to hammer
home his overall message that there should be a ban on BW. Hence, the full quote
with which he finished the article read: ‘Does the United States really need to
invest funds in a weapons system that may not work and will not deter? Unless
the military can satisfactorily demonstrate that the CBW threat from the enemy is
as real as it thinks it is, the answer seems to be no.’ (NYT 28/9/69).
Not surprisingly, the New York Times ran several articles at the time of Nixon’s
1969 announcement to renounce biological weapons. The idea that these weapons
were ‘probably unusable’ (NYT 26/11/69) appeared at several points in this cover-
age. So, ‘Germ Warfare: What Nixon Gave Up’ opens by saying that Nixon had
traded ‘a few horrible and probably unusable weapons’ for national security and
personal prestige. The author, special correspondent Robert Smith, continued by
listing why they might be unusable: ‘they have never been tested; it is not clear
what effect they would have on enemy forces or population’. Difficulties in identify-
ing the attacker, together with the possibility of preventing uncontrollable spread
were added to this litany, adding up to a weapon of ‘dubious strategic value’. The
same edition ran an article – ‘Activist Germ War Foe’ – profiling the Harvard scien-
tist Matthew Meselson who had briefly worked at the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency and had been working since then to help engineer the renunciation of
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biological weapons (NYT 26/11/69). Under the sub-heading ‘Calls Weapons
Useless’, Meselson is quoted as saying
I took the approach of a military planner… I tried to persuade people that these
weapons are useless, that they were intended to kill the population and we
already had other weapons that could do that. The real hazard of lethal
germs is that they can kill whole cities. (NYT 26/11/69)
This is a more nuanced version of the sceptical discourse. Here, biological
weapons were certainly not portrayed as ineffective – they could destroy cities –
but they were redundant for the USA, who already possessed nuclear weapons for
such purposes.
At other times the discourse of scepticism is used in a more straightforward, nega-
tive light to cast doubt on either the BWC negotiations or the Nixon decision. So,
just a few days later, the same Robert Smith, again commenting on the Nixon
decision, stated ‘But the experts see the pledges not to use biological agents in
war… as relatively unimportant. Biological weapons are of questionable military
value for a major power they say’ (NYT 30/11/69). The sub-heading above this
quote, ‘Questionable Value’, therefore signalled something subtly different from
the sub-heading ‘Calls Weapons Useless’ from the Meselson interview. That said,
Smith continued to elaborate on less tangible benefits of the decision: sending a
signal to give a ‘dampening effect’ to other nations interested in BW; preventing a
biological arms race with the Soviets; and preventing future development of new
weapons. Along similar lines, in April 1971 the Foreign Notes section of the
New York Times contained a short comment on progress in the BWC negotiations
suggesting that ‘while such a pact would be more cosmetic than real because it
would deal with weapons that no one expects to use anyway, it would represent pro-
gress in the long disarmament process’ (NYT 4/4/71).
In the UK press, similar scepticism was expressed from time to time. The com-
bined feeling that these are somehow an effective yet somehow ineffective weapon
is captured succinctly in a Guardian piece from 1969 that suggests ‘the evaluation
of their potential effect is mainly theoretical but all the same fearsome’ (Guardian
10/7/69). Elsewhere, the 1971 Times editorial, ‘Realism Replaces Propaganda’
cited earlier, welcomed break-throughs in the BWC negotiations but added ‘biologi-
cal weapons, on the other hand, are not yet effective. No government is known to be
relying on them for their security’ (Times 31/3/71). Its later editorial, ‘One Horror is
Put Aside’, marking the BWC signing ceremony, acknowledged the ‘sinister’ nature
of biological weapons ‘wrapped up in a science fiction image of men in white coats
breeding animate beings in Kafkaesque laboratories’ and – as discussed earlier – the
article generally took the effective, easy to produce line in its depiction of BW. That
said, the editorial also noted that ‘there are obvious drawbacks to using them’,
chiefly their unpredictability. It also observed that with CBW the latter were
‘much less than half the problem’ and that ‘biological weapons, in spite of
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conflicting reports and accusations have not [been used] – not against personnel at
all events’. In contrasting the ‘Kafkaesque laboratories’ with such weapons’ unpre-
dictability and lack of use, the editorial implied that a gap existed between the
science fiction inspired imaginary of biological weapons and cold reality.
Conclusion
What is a biological weapon? Journalists writing about nuclear and chemical
weapons, the cohabitants of the trinity of so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’,
have the historical anchors of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the trenches of the First
World War as reference points. At the time of the BWC negotiations, there had
been no proven use of BW in the twentieth century, and the research programmes
of the major states were veiled in secrecy. Historical anchors such as the Black
Death, and just within living memory at the time, the 1918 Spanish Flu could
provide some clues as to what a biological weapons attack might be like, as could
the imaginaries of science fiction. Within this context, as we have discussed, the
dominant press discourse of biological weapons as morally reprehensible, effective,
and militarily attractive prevailed alongside a competing discourse that depicted
these weapons as ineffective, unpredictable, and an unappealing military option.
We mentioned earlier that the analysis presented in this article tells us little about
how the press accounts were read or the reach of their influence. We do know that
the broadsheets we chose were fairly widely read and, moreover, in the UK National
Archives we have found files created by civil servants containing press cuttings about
CBW issues, including the BWC.16 Moreover, as social psychologists Bauer et al.
point out, ‘a newspaper represents the world for a group of people otherwise
people would not buy it. In this context the newspaper becomes an indicator of
their worldview’ (Bauer et al., 2000: 6). Assuming, therefore, that the press coverage
of biological weapons and their disarmament was not ignored, it makes sense to
think about what was at stake in the different depictions of BW. Describing biologi-
cal weapons as effective and morally repugnant – and particularly as unique –
creates a supportive logic of disarmament: who would not want to see these
weapons, above and beyond all others, banned in international law? This much is
obvious. But the second register of discourse makes the situation more complex –
more so as it occurs less frequently in the press reporting and so is harder to place
in context. As we have argued, this negative portrayal of biological weapons as
unpredictable and ineffective was certainly flagged in the context of downplaying
the significance or value of the BWC. But where it was put to more nuanced use,
exemplified in the interview with Matthew Meselson in the wake of the Nixon
decision to abandon the US offensive programme, biological weapons were
16Circulation figures are commercially available but beyond our research budget. Wikipedia – citing the authoritative
Audit Bureau of Circulations – gives the 1966 circulation figures for the Guardian (281,000) and Times (282,000).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_newspapers_in_the_United_Kingdom_by_circulation#Circulation_1950.E2.80
.931999 visited 11/07/14.
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indeed portrayed as useless, not because they were innocuous but because they were
redundant: the USA already had access to the horrific, indiscriminate means to
annihilate entire cities.
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